Tax Treaties, the Constitution, and the Noncompulsory Payment Rule by Avi-Yonah, Reuven S.
University of Michigan Law School 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository 
Law & Economics Working Papers 
3-14-2021 
Tax Treaties, the Constitution, and the Noncompulsory Payment 
Rule 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah 
University of Michigan Law School, aviyonah@umich.edu 





 Part of the Law and Economics Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, and the Tax Law 
s 
Working Paper Citation 
Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., "Tax Treaties, the Constitution, and the Noncompulsory Payment Rule" (2021). Law 
& Economics Working Papers. 178. 
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/178 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law & Economics Working Papers by an authorized administrator 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
DRAFT 3/14/21 
TAX TREATIES, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE NONCOMPULSORY PAYMENT RULE 
Reuven Avi-Yonah 
ABSTRACT 
US Tax treaties have been regarded as self-executing since the first treaty (with France) was 
ratified in 1932. Rebecca Kysar has argued this raises a doubt on whether the treaties are 
constitutional, because tax treaties (like other treaties) are negotiated by the executive branch 
and ratified by the Senate with no involvement by the House, and all tax-raising measures must 
originate in the House under the Origination Clause (U.S. Const. Art I, section 7, clause 7). Her 
preferred solution is to make tax treaties non-self executing, but that would reverse the 
universal practice since 1932, and is therefore unlikely. Moreover, tax treaties are generally 
precluded from raising revenue by the Saving Clause (Art. 1(4)). But Kysar’s argument raises 
another question in regard to the noncompulsory payment rule (Treas. Reg. 1.902-2(e)(5)). 
Under the noncompulsory payment rule, a US taxpayer who is entitled to a treaty benefit and 
does not avail itself of the benefit may not get a foreign tax credit for the excess of the 
withholding tax levied over the treaty rate (Treas. Reg. 1.902-2(e)(5), Example 6). But this 
means that the treaty raises the taxpayer’s US taxes over the amount it would pay in the 
absence of a treaty, which in turn raises the constitutional issue invoked by Kysar. The paper 
concludes by questioning whether the noncompulsory payment rule is worth the complexity it 
imposes on both taxpayers and the IRS.  
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US Tax treaties have been regarded as self-executing since the first treaty (with France) was 
ratified in 1932.1 Rebecca Kysar has argued this raises a doubt on whether the treaties are 
constitutional, because tax treaties (like other treaties) are negotiated by the executive branch 
and ratified by the Senate with no involvement by the House, and all tax-raising measures must 
originate in the House under the Origination Clause (U.S. Const. Art I, section 7, clause 7). Her 
preferred solution is to make tax treaties non-self executing, i.e., to require them to be 
incorporated in legislation, as is the practice in many other countries (e.g., the UK).2 
 
Kysar’s solution would reverse the universal practice since 1932, and is therefore unlikely to be 
implemented. Moreover, tax treaties are generally precluded from affecting revenue from US 
taxpayers by the Saving Clause (Art. 1(4)). Under the Saving Clause, “this Convention shall not 
affect the taxation by a Contracting State of its residents (as determined under Article 4 
(Resident)) and its citizens. “ The Saving Clause is generally regarded as required by the 
Origination Clause because if a US tax treaty were to affect taxation of US citizens, this would 
violate the rule that all tax measures must originate in the House.3 
  
But Kysar’s argument raises another question in regard to the noncompulsory payment rule 
(Treas. Reg. 1.902-2(e)(5)). The noncompulsory payment rule, which has no statutory basis in 
the Code, states that: 
 
An amount paid is not a compulsory  payment, and thus is not an amount of tax paid, to 
the extent that the  amount paid exceeds the  amount of liability under foreign law for 
tax. An  amount paid does not exceed the  amount of such  liability if the  amount paid is 
determined by the  taxpayer in a manner that is consistent with a reasonable 
interpretation and  application of the substantive and procedural provisions of foreign 
law (including applicable tax treaties) in such a way as to reduce, over time, 
the  taxpayer's reasonably expected  liability under foreign law for tax, and if 
the  taxpayer exhausts all effective and practical remedies, including invocation of 
 
1 US Treaties are self-executing if they do not require further Congressional action to implement once they are 
ratified by the Senate. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 254 (1829) (holding that a treaty governing Spanish land 
grants in Florida was not self-executing).  
2 Kysar, Rebecca M., On the Constitutionality of Tax Treaties (May 3, 2013). Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 
38, 2013, Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 274, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2034904 
3 See, e.g., Technical Explanation of the US-UK Tax Treaty (2003): "Paragraph 2 also means that the Convention 
may not increase the tax burden on a resident of a Contracting State beyond the burden determined under 
domestic law. Thus, a right to tax given by the Convention cannot be exercised unless that right also exists under 
internal law. It follows that, under the principle of paragraph 2, a taxpayer’s U.S. tax liability need not be 
determined under the Convention if the Code would produce a more favorable result.” See also Jeffrey A. 
Schoenblum, Bilateral Transfer Tax Treaties, Tax Mgmt. Portfolios (BNA) No. 851 (2012) (noting that it is routinely 
accepted among tax professionals that, in order to comply with the Origination Clause, tax treaties cannot increase 
tax liability).  
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competent authority procedures available under applicable tax treaties, to reduce, over 
time, the  taxpayer's  liability for foreign tax (including liability pursuant to a foreign tax 
audit adjustment). Where foreign  tax law includes options or  elections whereby 
a  taxpayer's  tax liability may be shifted, in whole or part, to a different  year or years, 
the  taxpayer's use or failure to use such  options or  elections does not  result in 
a  payment in excess of the  taxpayer's  liability for foreign tax. An interpretation 
or  application of foreign law is not reasonable if there is actual  notice or 
constructive  notice (e.g., a published court decision) to the taxpayer that the 
interpretation or  application is likely to be erroneous. In interpreting foreign  tax law, 
a  taxpayer may  generally rely on advice obtained in good faith from competent foreign 
tax advisors to whom the  taxpayer has disclosed the relevant  facts. A remedy is 
effective and practical only if the  cost thereof (including the risk of offsetting or 
additional tax liability) is reasonable in light of the amount at  issue and the likelihood of 
success. A settlement by a  taxpayer of two or more  issues will be evaluated on an 
overall basis, not on an  issue-by-issue basis, in determining whether an  amount is a 
compulsory  amount. A  taxpayer is not required to alter its form of doing business, its 
business conduct, or the form of any business transaction in order to reduce 
its  liability under foreign law for tax. 
 
Two of the examples given in the regulation for noncompulsory payments do not involve tax 
treaties (Treas. Reg. 1.902-2(e)(5), Examples 1 and 5). Examples 2, 3 and 4 do involve a tax 
treaty that embodies the arm’s length standard, but it is not clear that the existence vel non of 
the treaty affects the result, because the arm’s length standard would usually apply to related 
party transactions under both US and foreign law in the absence of a treaty.  
 
Similarly, most of the case law under the noncompulsory payment rule does not involve tax 
treaties, or if it does it only involves the arm’s length standard, and the IRS has largely been 
unsuccessful in applying the rule to deny foreign tax credits.4 The exception is Procter & 
Gamble, in which the taxpayer paid tax on the same royalties to both Korea and Japan, and was 
held to have violated the noncompulsory payments rule because it only tried to challenge the 
Korean tax under the applicable treaty but not the Japanese tax, so it could not get credit for 
the Japanese tax.5 But in this case as well, it is not clear that the treaty by itself changed the 
result.  
 
However, the regulation also contains the following example: 
 
Example 6. 
The internal law of country X imposes a 25 percent tax on the gross amount of interest from 
sources in country X that is received by a nonresident of country X. Country X law imposes the 
 
4 For example, see International Business Machine Corp. v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 661, 675 (1997); Schering Corp 
v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 579, 600-603 (1978); Coca-Cola Co. v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. No. 21, at 15-16 (2017). 
5 Procter & Gamble Co. v. United States, 2010-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 50,593, at 85,545 (S.D. Ohio 2010) 
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tax on the nonresident recipient and requires any resident of country X that pays such interest 
to a nonresident to withhold and pay over to country X 25 percent of such interest, which is 
applied to offset the recipient's liability for the 25 percent tax. A tax treaty between the United 
States and country X overrides internal law of country X and provides that country X may not 
tax interest received by a resident of the United States from a resident of country X at a rate in 
excess of 10 percent of the gross amount of such interest. A resident of the United States may 
claim the benefit of the treaty only by applying for a refund of the excess withheld amount (15 
percent of the gross amount of interest income) after the end of the taxable year. A, a resident 
of the United States, receives a gross amount of 100u (units of country X currency) of interest 
income from a resident of country X from sources in country X in the taxable year 1984, from 
which 25u of country X tax is withheld. A does not file a timely claim for refund. 15u of the 
amount withheld (25u-10u) is not a compulsory payment and hence is not an amount of tax. 
 
On its face, this is a justified application of the noncompulsory payment rule, because the 
taxpayer could under the specified facts easily obtain a refund of the extra 15u by filing a 
refund claim. It is unclear whether any actual taxpayer is ever so negligent. More commonly, 
the taxpayer faces a foreign withholding agent that ignores the treaty by applying the higher 
withholding amount, and the taxpayer’s efforts to obtain a refund may be unavailing in many 
countries that follow the principle that a tax withheld can never be refunded.  
 
But the example raises an interesting question: Suppose there was no treaty, what would the 
result have been? The answer is clearly that in that case there would be withholding of 25u 
with no refund and a full foreign tax credit. So here we have a situation in which the tax treaty 
by its very existence and by the terms of the relevant article raises the US taxpayer’s US tax 
liability because it now has to pay 25u to X and another 15u to the United States. What about 
the ability of the US taxpayer to choose not to invoke the treaty if this leads to a more favorable 
tax result?6 
 
In my opinion, such a result is unconstitutional because the tax treaty raises the US taxpayer’s 
US tax, in violation of the Origination Clause.7 
 
More broadly, one may question the policy rationale behind the noncompulsory payment rule, 
which as far as I know is unique among countries that allow foreign tax credits, just as the fact 
that US tax treaties are self-executing puts the US in a small minority of countries that do not 
require any legislation for a tax treaty to come into effect.8 The noncompulsory payments rule 
is full of limitations that are difficult for taxpayers to navigate: When is “the  cost thereof 
(including the risk of offsetting or additional tax liability) … reasonable in light of 
the amount at  issue and the likelihood of success”? The answer to that may be difficult for a 
 
6 In general, taxpayers may choose between the Code and the treaty, as long as they are consistent. See, e.g., Rev. 
Rul. 84-17, 1984-1 C.B. 308; Rev. Rul. 80-147, 1980-1 C.B. 16.  
7 Kysar argues that based on the case law a treaty can be considered as falling under the Origination Clause even if 
it just changes the tax result, not just if it raises more revenue, but in this case the treaty actually raises more 
revenue. Kysar, supra.  
8 Kysar, supra.  
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taxpayer to ascertain. And how does a taxpayer distinguish transactions that fall under the rule 
from transactions that “alter its form of doing business, its business conduct, or the form of any 
business transaction”? Moreover, the IRS has lost most of the cases it litigated under the rule.  
 
Perhaps it is time to eliminate the noncompulsory payment rule as too complex and not worth 
the effort it requires from both taxpayers and the IRS, as well as sometimes unconstitutional. In 
addition, the rule could be challenged if the Supreme Court does away with Chevron deference 
because it has no basis in the statutory text. If that outcome is considered too generous to 
taxpayers who would be tempted to be negligent at the expense of the fisc, the solution may 
be to place limits on full creditability, as Dan Shaviro has long advocated and as Congress has 
done for GILTI.9  
 
9 See Shaviro, Daniel, The Case Against Foreign Tax Credits (March 2010). NYU School of Law, Public Law Research 
Paper No. 10-12, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-09, Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1547312 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1547312; IRC section 250 (imposing 
an 80% limit on foreign tax credits offsetting of US tax under GILTI).  
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